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OUTLOOK 
Annenberg Proposal for the Reform of Libel Law: 
Reform or Regression? 
A Defense of the Annenberg 
Libel Reform Proposal 
BY RODNEY A. SMOLLA 
The Case for Reform 
The case for reforming the law of libel is familiar, 
and fundamentally sound. The question posed by The 
Annenberg Washington Program's reform proposal 
is not whether libel law should be reformed, but 
whether the proposal contains the right reforms. 
The argument favoring reform is the most com-
pelling if one strives to look at the current system 
objectively and neutrally, without a pro-plaintiff or 
pro-defendant bias. If one were starting from scratch 
to design the "perfect" legal mechanism for han-
dling libel disputes, one would never arrive at the 
current system. It is costly, cumbersome, and fails 
to vindicate either free speech values or the protec-
tion of reputation. The enormous defense costs of 
protracted litigation exert a chilling effect on the 
press, while plaintiffs are left with no meaningful 
legal remedy for reputational injury. 
The Defense Perspective 
But what if one looks at the current system from a 
more selfish viewpoint? From the perspective of the 
press, for example, does the pursuit of reform make 
sense? Even the simple proposition that libel law 
needs reform is controversial. From the defense 
view, certainly, a case may be made for the status 
quo. The siege on the citadel has abated. Several 
years ago, an air of crisis existed. Suits against the 
press were increasing, and so were multimillion 
dollar damages awards. The libel insurance market 
was rapidly deteriorating. Supreme Court Justices 
were hinting that Gertz v. Robert Welch. Inc., and 
perhaps even New York Times Co. v. Sullivan should 
be reexamined. And the Sharon v. Time, Inc. and 
Westmoreland v. CBS suits were in mid-swing, 
seeming to symbolize the escalating libel threat. 
The crisis, however, ran its course. Most media 
defendants have recently experienced an easing in 
the number of libel suits they are facing. Insurance 
markets have adjusted. The Supreme Court in Hus-
tler Magazine v. Falwell, through none other than 
Chief Justice William Rehnquist, went out of its way 
to endorse the basic principles of New York Times, 
Gertz, and their progeny. And the failure of either 
Defense Minister Ariel Sharon or General William 
Westmoreland to prevail in their suits illustrated to 
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plaintiffs and the plaintiffs' bar the 
futility of bucking the First 
Amendment in a libel suit. Defen-
dants had reached the winter of 
their discontent. 
Underlying Conditions 
Still Dangerous 
The case for libel reform, how-
ever, is no less compelling in 1989 
than in 1986. Indeed, the time for 
reform is never in the heat of a 
crisis, but after it, in the quiet be-
tween storms. Defendants may 
feel unthreatened at the moment, 
but there is no reason whatsoever 
to think that the libel crisis of three 
years ago could not suddenly 
reappear. Trends in litigation 
come and go. Underlying condi-
tions have not changed. Plaintiffs 
are still quite capable of suing, 
often for hidden agendas. Judges 
are still quite capable of denying 
defense motions for summary 
judgment. Juries are still prone to 
return large verdicts. And even 
though defendants have every 
reason to expect that their excel-
lent record at the appellate level 
will continue, so will the high lit-
igation costs of a system that pro-
vides most of its defense 
protection at the back end rather 
than the front end, of the litiga-
tion. So even if utterly unmoved 
by any feelings of sympathy for 
plaintiffs, the press has every rea-
son to thoughtfully explore re-
form. 
States as Laboratories 
But if reform makes sense in the 
abstract, what about the particu-
lar? Is the Annenberg package de-
fensible? Before turning to the 
merits, a number of preliminary 
points are worth making. The pro-
posal is in the form of a model 
statute. The complete statutory 
text, and accompanying section-
by-section explanatory analysis, 
form the heart of the report. If 
nothing else, the care with which 
this reform blueprint was drafted 
has substantially advanced public 
discussion of libel law, and helped 
focus debate. The report deliber-
ately avoids taking a position on 
whether the statute should be 
adopted at the state or federal 
level. The group was divided on 
the issue. Ultimately, one uniform 
nationwide law of libel makes 
sense to me, given the multistate 
nature of the modern communi-
cations industry, and the fact that 
there is, after all, only one First 
Amendment. But as Justice Bran-
deis pointed out, states are ideal 
laboratories for experiment in a 
federal system, and the notion of 
trying out the Annenberg pro-
posal on an experimental basis at 
the state level would be a sensible 
way to proceed. 
The Annenberg Group 
Deliberative Process 
Secondly, the composition of the 
eleven-member group that partic-
ipated in formulating the pro-
posal is, to say the least, striking. 
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How could consensus be reached 
by persons as ideologically di-
verse as Anthony Lewis, Bruce 
Fein, Richard Schmidt, and Her-
bert Schmertz? How could one of 
General Westmoreland's former 
lawyers, Anthony Murry, and ar-
dent defense attorneys like Sam-
uel Klein, Roslyn Mazer, and 
Sandra Baron agree? When one 
adds to the mix the very different 
experiences of a distinguished 
trial judge, Lois Forer, and a lead-
ing media insurance expert, Chad 
Milton, the sweeping agreement 
of the group seems even more re-
markable. The end-product this 
group produced is not a series of 
watered-down compromises, a 
string of lowest common denom-
inators. The people in this group 
were not shrinking violets. The 
debate was vigorous, but thought-
ful. This was no labor negotiation, 
in which people came to the table 
willing to treat the First Amend-
ment like a bargaining chip. It 
was, rather, a conscientious ex-
ercise in problem-solving. As Chad 
Milton put it, "Many of us have 
adapted to the status quo, such 
that we may have a financial or 
emotional attachment to it, and 
there is always reluctance to try 
unknown paths. In that regard, 
this proposal urges us to set aside 
self-interest and expediency in fa-
vor of what is, in my view, the right 
thing to do." 
The Right Thing to Do 
Why is it "the right thing to do"? 
Let me address several of the 
principal objections and fears that 
the report has generated. This will 
be a "bipartisan" defense, dis-
cussing both plaintiff and defense 
concerns. 
Would the statute trigger an in-
crease in frivolous suits? This fear 
is grounded in the suspicion that 
plaintiffs will file suits and im-
mediately opt for the declaratory 
judgment option, in which they no 
longer face the impediment of 
proving actual malice (or negli-
gence, in private-figure cases), and 
may receive the "bonus" of attor-
ney's fees if they prevail. The fear 
is reasonable, and probably the 
type of question that can never be 
satisfactorily resolved until the 
statute is actually enacted some-
where and tried for several years. 
There are, however, reasons to 
believe that the fear is unfounded. 
First, it must be remembered 
that every would-be plaintiff must, 
within thirty days of the publica-
tion of the defamatory statement, 
file a demand for a retraction or 
opportunity to reply, as a prereq-
uisite to filing suit. This request 
"must specify the statements 
claimed to be false and defama-
tory and must set forth the plain-
tiff's version of the facts." The 
defendant then has thirty days to 
respond, and may absolutely bar 
litigation by honoring the defen-
dant's request. This is a powerful 
defense option, for the defendant 
who has in fact been "caught red-
handed" in a mistake now has the 
ability to completely eliminate ex-
posure to litigation. More signifi-
cantly, when the plaintiff's only 
complaint is that the published 
story contained defamatory impli-
cations, the defendant may avoid 
suit simply by retracting the im-
plication. 
Truth, under the Annen-
berg proposal, is made to 
stand naked in the 
declaratory judgment 
procedure, without the 
protective clothing of 
New York Times. 
Secondly, even in the absence 
of a retraction or reply barring the 
suit, the plaintiff faces down-side 
risks of his own. The declaratory 
judgment mode is not a perfectly 
level playing field, but rather has 
a bias designed to protect First 
Amendment interests. The plain-
tiff has the burden of proving fals-
ity, and must meet that burden 
with "clear and convincing" evi-
dence. Much more significantly, 
the plaintiff must deal with the risk 
that he will be forced to pay the 
defendant's attorneys' fees if he 
does not prevail. 
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Third, the statute very carefully 
circumscribes the range of state-
ments that qualify as defamatory. 
No statute will ever completely 
solve the intractable problem of 
separating statements of fact from 
statements of opinion. The An-
nenberg proposal, however, con-
tains an elaborate definition of 
opinion that goes a long way to-
ward insulating certain genres of 
speech by presumptively classify-
ing them as opinion, including 
fiction, satire or parody, artistic, 
athletic, literary, academic, culi-
nary, theatrical, religious, or po-
litical commentary, letters to the 
editor, editorials, and editorial 
cartoons. 
If no statute will ever eliminate 
all problems of separating fact 
from opinion, a statute may come 
close to eliminating exposure to 
suit for neutral reportage. The 
proposal contains a broad neutral 
reportage privilege, barring lia-
bility for the repetition of the de-
famatory statements of others, 
when the quote is accurately re-
ported, involves a matter of pub-
lic interest, and the source is 
identified. Finally, the fear of friv-
olous suits is mitigated by the fact 
that the report requires a plaintiff 
to put up or shut up. The plaintiff 
must be able to articulate prior to 
suit what the facts are, and must 
have confidence in his or her abil-
ity to prove them. Under the cur-
rent system, plaintiffs have their 
own ability to hide behind New 
York Times Co. v. Sullivan. They 
can file suit and then blame their 
failure to recover on the First 
Amendment's requirement that 
fault, in addition to falsity, be 
demonstrated. Under the pro-
posal, the nuisance suit carries the 
risk of deeper embarrassment and 
liability for attorneys' fees. 
The PlaintifPs Perspective 
Do plaintiffs get a fair shake under 
this proposal? If defendants may 
distrust the declaratory judgment 
option as an invitation to frivo-
lous suits, plaintiffs may claim foul 
in the taking away of their right to 
money damages in any case in 
which the defendant forces the 
case into the declaratory judg-
ment mode. Certainly, there will 
be some plaintiffs who will suffer 
demonstrable damages and none-
theless be shut out by a defendant 
who opts for the declaratory judg-
ment procedure. Reforms, how-
ever, must be designed for the 
large run of cases, and there are 
reasons for believing that most 
plaintiffs will be much better off 
under the proposal. A plaintiff 
who gets a speedy judicial decla-
ration that the defamatory state-
ments leveled against him were 
false, and who gets attorneys' fees, 
is better off under the proposal 
than under current law. Most 
plaintiffs will in fact be made 
whole by such a declaratory rem-
edy. After all appeals are ex-
hausted, most plaintiffs lose under 
existing law. Under the proposal, 
those with meritorious claims on 
the issue of truth or falsity will 
usually win. 
But why not permit plaintiffs 
who prevail at the declaratory 
judgment stage to still recover for 
special damages-provable pe-
cuniary losses? To permit this 
would be to defeat the whole pur-
pose of the declaratory judgment 
innovation, for it would open up 
every case to a mini-trial on spe-
cial damages, and defeat the 
streamlining purpose of the de-
claratory judgment procedure. 
Constitutional Questions 
Is it constitutional to expose a de-
fendant to liability for attorneys' 
fees without the benefit of the ac-
tual malice or negligence fault 
protections of New York Times 
and Gertz? Again, this is a ques-
tion that cannot be answered de-
finitively until the statute is tried 
and tested in court. A number of 
arguments support the constitu-
tionality of the fee-shifting provi-
sions of the proposal. The closest 
analogy under existing law is the 
Civil Rights Attorneys' Fees 
Awards Act of 1976. In civil rights 
litigation, the Supreme Court has 
held that a prevailing plaintiff may 
recover attorneys' fees even 
against a defendant that enjoys 
qualified or absolute immunity 
from damages, if the plaintiff pre-
vails on claims for injunctive or 
declaratory relief. The analogy is 
apt, because immunity doctrines 
in civil rights cases are designed 
to insulate officials from the chill-
ing effect of litigation, unless they 
have knowingly violated settled 
constitutional rights. This bears a 
striking resemblance to the 
"breathing space" rationale of 
New York Times, and if anything, 
is an even more intense commit-
ment to avoiding "chilling ef-
fects." Yet even in these civil 
rights cases, the Court has drawn 
a sharp distinction between liabil-
ity for damages and liability for at-
torneys' fees. 
On a less legalistic plane, it must 
be remembered that the fault 
standards of New York Times and 
Gertz were crafted to protect First 
Amendment values in the context 
of a traditional common law suit 
for money damages. If the net 
"chilling effect" of all the provi-
sions of the comprehensive new 
reform structure would be less 
than that of the old system (in-
cluding New York Times and 
Gertz) then the fee-shifting device 
should be constitutional. 
Truth in the Marketplace 
There are many other interesting 
issues posed by the proposal, and 
they cannot all be addressed in 
this space. The discussion in the 
last paragraph, however, touches 
on a final, more global point, 
worth emphasizing in conclusion. 
The various provisions of the pro-
posal are meant to work together, 
to create a matrix of incentives 
that encourage both sides to ex-
amine their positions self-criti-
cally, and settle in the early stages 
of the dispute. Philosophically, 
these incentives combine to make 
the prompt dissemination of truth 
in the marketplace the central 
driving purpose of the reform. 
Some may object to this preoc-
cupation with truth, fearing that 
the First Amendment has been 
sacrificed on truth's altar. This is 
a somewhat awkward position to 
be in (How can one be against 
truth?), but despite its surface un-
seemliness, it is an objection that 
I take very seriously. For one might 
argue forcefully that the classic 
Holmes/Brandeis free speech tra-
dition will not countenance gov-
ernment as truth's arbiter. The 
only test of truth is the market, and 
government has no business de-
claring it, in this libel reform stat-
ute or anywhere else. 
This argument, however, proves 
too much. For if followed to its 
logical end it would unravel even 
the current law of libel, in which 
the judicial system does, after all, 
purport to pass on truth or falsity 
as part of the litigation. Truth, un-
der the Annenberg proposal, is 
made to stand naked in the dec-
laratory judgment procedure, 
without the protective clothing of 
New York Times. But freedom of 
speech is not left more exposed by 
this statute. When all of the pro-
posal's provisions are taken in 
combination, free speech values 
are enhanced, and worthy plain-
tiffs are offered a meaningful rem-
edy. The Annenberg proposal 
suggests that reforming libel law 
may not be a zero-sum game after 
all. We will never find out, of 
course, until some brave legisla-
ture gives it a try. 
Rodney A. Smolla is the Cutler 
Professor of Law and Director of 
the Institute of Bill of Rights Law 
at the College of William and Mary 
School of Law. He was the Direc-
tor of The Annenberg Libel Project. 
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